Lessons from the Asian Crisis by Frederic S. Mishkin
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The financial crisis which began in July 1997 in the East Asian countries, Thailand, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Korea, has had devastating effects on their economies.  Growth rates in these countries
which were in excess of five percent before 1997, turned sharply negative in 1998 and, at the time
of this writing it is not yet clear when these economies will turn the corner and resume positive rates
of growth.   This paper examines why these countries, which were part of what has been termed
"the Asian miracle" and were able to eradicate so much poverty, are now undergoing severe
economic contractions, with such harmful effects on their populations.  A breakdown of information
in financial markets is the key factor that has driven this crisis.  After laying out an asymmetric
information view of the Asian financial crisis, this paper goes on to use this framework to explore
lessons from this crisis. 
1. 
An Asymmetric Information View 
 of the Asian Crisis
The financial system plays a critical role in the economy because, when it operates properly,
it channels funds from those who have saved surplus funds to those who need these funds to engage
in productive investment opportunities.  The major barrier to the financial system performing this job
properly is asymmetric information, the fact that one party to a financial contract does not have the
same information as the other party, which results in moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
An asymmetric information view of financial crises, which I have described in more detail elsewhere
in Mishkin (1996a, 1997), defines a financial crisis to be a nonlinear disruption to financial markets     
1Indeed, the analysis here explains why as pointed out in Kamin (1999), the crises in Chile in 1982, Mexico
in 1994-95 and East Asia in 1997-98 bear so much similarity to each other, in contrast to the debt crisis in
Mexico and other Latin American countries in the 1980s.  For a discussion of the Chilean crisis, see Diaz-
Alejandro (1985) and for the Mexican crisis, see Mishkin (1996).
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in which the asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and moral hazard become much
worse, so that financial markets are no longer able to efficiently channel funds to those who have the
most productive investment opportunities.
Here asymmetric information analysis is used to explain the East Asian financial crisis.  This
analysis emphasizes that the crisis was caused by fundamentals, particularly problems in the financial
sector, and is thus consistent with recent work by Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998), Goldstein
(1998) and Krugman (1998).  However, it does not rule out that illiquidity and multiple equilibria
stories of the type outlined by Radelet and Sachs (1998) played some role as well.  The analysis here,
however, goes beyond these other papers by focusing on the mechanisms through which the financial
crisis in East Asia caused sharp contractions in economic activity.
In most financial crises, and particularly in the East Asian crises, the key factor that causes
asymmetric information problems to worsen and launch a financial crisis is a deterioration in balance
sheets, particularly those in the financial sector.  As in earlier financial crises, such as in Chile in 1982
or Mexico in 1994-95 where a similar analysis applies,
1 the story starts with financial liberalization
that resulted in the lending boom which was fed by capital inflows.  Once restrictions were lifted on
both interest-rate ceilings and the type of lending allowed, lending increased dramatically.   As
documented in Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998), Goldstein (1998), World Bank (1998) and
Kamin (1999), credit extensions in the Asian crisis countries grew at far higher rates than GDP.  The
problem with the resulting lending boom was not that lending expanded, but that it expanded so
rapidly that excessive risk-taking was the result, with large losses on loans in the future.  
There are two reasons why excessive risk-taking occurred after the financial liberalization in
East Asia.  The first is that managers of banking institutions often lacked the expertise to manage risk3
appropriately when new lending opportunities opened up after financial liberalization.  In addition,
with rapid growth of lending, banking institutions could not add the necessary managerial capital
(well-trained loan officers, risk-assessment systems, etc.) fast enough to enable these institutions to
screen and monitor these new loans appropriately.
The second reason why excessive risk-taking occurred was the inadequacy of the
regulatory/supervisory system.  Even if there was no explicit government safety net for the banking
system, there clearly was an implicit safety net that created a moral hazard problem.  Depositors and
foreign lenders to the banks in East Asia, knew that there were likely to be government bailouts to
protect them, thus providing them with little incentive to monitor banks, with the result that these
institutions had an incentive to take on excessive risk by aggressively seeking out new loan business.
Emerging market countries, and particularly those in East Asia, are notorious for weak
financial regulation and supervision.  When financial liberalization yielded new opportunities to take
on risk, these weak regulatory/supervisory systems could not limit the moral hazard created by the
government safety net and excessive risk-taking was the result.  This problem was made even more
severe by the rapid credit growth in a lending boom which stretched the resources of the bank
supervisors.  Bank supervisory agencies were also unable to add to their supervisory capital (well-
trained examiners and information systems) fast enough to enable them to keep up with their
increased responsibilities both because they had to monitor new activities of the banks, but also
because these activities were expanding at a rapid pace.  
Capital inflows make this problem even worse.  Once financial liberalization is adopted,
foreign capital flows into banks in emerging market countries because it earns high yields but is likely
to be protected by the government safety net, whether it is provided by the government of the
emerging market country or by international agencies such as the IMF.  The result is that capital
inflows can fuel a lending boom which leads to excessive risk-taking on the part of banks, and this     
2See Goldstein (1998).
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is exactly what happened in East Asia where capital inflows amounted to between fifty to one-
hundred billion dollars annually from 1993 to 1996. Folkerts-Landau, et. al (1995), for example,
found that emerging market countries in the Asian-Pacific region with large net private capital inflows
also experienced large increases in their banking sectors.  
The outcome of the lending boom arising after financial liberalization was huge loan losses
and a subsequent deterioration of banks' balance sheets.  In the case of the East-Asian crisis countries,
the share of nonperforming loans to total loans rose to between 15 and 35 percent.
2  The deterioration
in bank balance sheets was the key fundamental that drove these  countries into their financial crises.
There are two ways in which problems in the banking sector can lead to a financial crisis in
emerging market countries like those in East Asia.  First, the deterioration in the balance sheets of
banking firms can lead them to restrict their lending in order to improve their capital ratios or can
even lead to a full-scale banking crisis which forces many banks into insolvency, thereby directly
removing the ability of the banking sector to make loans.  
Second, the deterioration in bank balance sheets can promote a currency crisis because it
becomes very difficult for the central bank to defend its currency against a speculative attack.  Any
rise in interest rates to keep the domestic currency from depreciating has the additional effect of
weakening the banking system further because the rise in interest rates hurts banks' balance sheets.
This negative effect of a rise in interest rates on banks' balance sheets occurs because of their maturity
mismatch and their exposure to increased credit risk when the economy deteriorates.  Thus, when a
speculative attack on the currency occurs in an emerging market country, if the central bank raises
interest rates sufficiently to defend the currency, the banking system may collapse.  Once investors
recognize that a country's weak banking system makes it less likely that the central bank will take the
steps to successfully defend the domestic currency, they have even greater incentives to attack the
currency because expected profits from selling the currency have now risen.  Thus, with a weakened     
3This structure of debt contacts is very different from that in most industrialized countries, which have
almost all of their debt denominated in domestic currency, with much of it long-term.  This different debt
structure explains why there is such a different response to a devaluation in emerging market countries than
there is in industrialized countries.
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banking sector, a successful speculative attack is likely to materialize and can be triggered by any of
many factors, a large current account deficit being just one of them.  In this view, the deterioration
in the banking sector is the key fundamental that causes the currency crisis to occur.
A currency crisis and the subsequent devaluation then helps trigger a full-fledged financial
crisis in emerging market countries because of two key features of debt contracts. In emerging market
countries, debt contracts both have very short duration and are often denominated in foreign
currencies.
3  These features of debt contracts generate three mechanisms through which a currency
crisis in an emerging market country increases asymmetric information problems in credit markets,
thereby causing a financial crisis to occur. 
The first mechanism involves the direct effect of currency devaluation on the balance sheets
of firms.  With debt contracts denominated in foreign currency, when there is a devaluation of the
domestic currency, the debt burden of domestic firms increases.  On the other hand, since assets are
typically denominated in domestic currency, there is no simultaneous increase in the value of firms'
assets.  The result is a that a devaluation leads to a substantial deterioration in firms' balance sheets
and a decline in net worth, which, in turn, worsens the adverse selection problem because effective
collateral has shrunk, thereby providing less protection to lenders.  Furthermore, the decline in net
worth increases moral hazard incentives for firms to take on greater risk because they have less to
lose if the loans go sour.  Because lenders are now subject to much higher risks of losses, there is now
a decline in lending and hence a decline in investment and economic activity.  
The damage to balance sheets from devaluation in the aftermath of the foreign exchange crisis
has been a major source of the contraction of the economies in East Asia, as it was in Mexico in
1995.  This mechanism was particularly strong in Indonesia which saw the value of its currency6
decline by over seventy-five percent, thus increasing the rupiah value of foreign-denominated debts
by a factor of four.  Even a healthy firm initially with a strong balance sheet is likely to be driven into
insolvency by such a shock if it has a significant amount of foreign-denominated debt.
A second mechanism linking currency crises with financial crises in emerging market countries
can occur cause the devaluation might lead to higher inflation.  Because many emerging market
countries have previously experienced both high and variable inflation, their central banks are unlikely
to have deep-rooted credibility as inflation fighters.  Thus, a sharp depreciation of the currency after
a speculative attack that leads to immediate upward pressure on prices can lead to a dramatic rise in
both actual and expected inflation.  Indeed Mexican inflation surged to 50% in 1995 after the foreign
exchange crisis in 1994 and we have seen a similar phenomenon in Indonesia, the worst hit of the East
Asian countries.  A rise in expected inflation after the currency crisis exacerbates the financial crisis
because it leads to a sharp rise in interest rates.  The interaction of the short duration of debt contracts
and the interest rate rise leads to huge increases in interest payments by firms, thereby weakening
firms' cash flow position and further weakening their balance sheets.  Then, as we have seen,
asymmetric information problems increase and both lending and economic activity are likely to
undergo a sharp decline.
A third mechanism linking the financial crisis and the currency crisis arises because the
devaluation of the domestic currency can lead to further deterioration in the balance sheets of the
banking sector, provoking a large-scale banking crisis.  In emerging market countries, banks have
many liabilities denominated in foreign currency which increase sharply in value when a depreciation
occurs.  On the other hand, the problems of firms and households mean that they are unable to pay
off their debts, also resulting in loan losses on the assets side of the banks' balance sheets.  The result
is that banks' balance sheets are squeezed from both the assets and liabilities side and the net worth
of banks therefore declines.  An additional problem for the banks is that many of their foreign-
currency denominated debt is very short-term, so that the sharp increase in the value of this debt leads7
to liquidity problems for the banks because this debt needs to be paid back quickly.  The result of the
further deterioration in bank balance sheets and their weakened capital base is that they cut back
lending.   In the extreme case in which the deterioration of bank balance sheets leads to a banking
crisis that forces many banks to close their doors, thereby directly limiting the ability of the banking
sector to make loans.  Since banks are special in the sense that they play an important role in
overcoming adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the credit markets and so are the only
source of lending for many businesses, when bank lending collapses, the economy does as well. 
The bottom line from this asymmetric information analysis is that the East Asian financial
crisis was the result of a systemic collapse in both financial and non-financial firm balance sheets that
made asymmetric information problems worse.  The result was that financial markets were no longer
able to channel funds to those with productive investment opportunities which then led to devastating
effects on the economies of these countries. 
2.
Lessons
The asymmetric information analysis above of what caused the financial crisis and economic
contractions in East Asia can be used to derive several lessons on how future crises like this can be
avoided and what to do if such crises occur.  The first lesson from the crisis is that there is a strong
rationale for government intervention to get the financial system back on its feet: for emerging market
countries this requires an international lender of last resort.  The second lesson is that an international
lender of last resort has to impose appropriate conditionality on its lending in order if it wants to
avoid creating excessive moral hazard which encourages financial instability.  The third lesson is that
although capital flows did contribute to the crisis, they are a symptom rather than an underlying cause
of the crisis: thus exchange controls are unlikely to be a useful strategy to avoid future crises.   The     
4See Mishkin (1991, 1997) for a discussion of how expansionary monetary policy and a lender of last resort
operation in industrialized countries can work to keep asymmetric information problems from getting out of
control, thereby promoting economic recovery.
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fourth lesson is that pegged exchange-rate regimes are a very dangerous strategy for emerging market
countries and can make financial crises more likely.  We look at each of these lessons in turn.
2.1 The Rationale for an International Lender of Last Resort
We have seen that a seizing up of information in the financial system when a financial crisis
occurs leads to disastrous consequences for the economy.  To recover, the financial system needs to
be restarted so that it can resume its job of channeling funds to those with productive investment
opportunities. In industrialized countries, domestic central banks have the ability to do this both with
expansionary monetary policy and with a lender of last resort operation.
4  The asymmetric information
view argues however, that central banks in emerging market countries are much less likely to have
this capability.  Thus there is a strong argument that an international lender of last resort may be
needed to cope with financial crises in these countries.  However, even if there is a need for an
international lender of last resort, engaging in lender of last resort activities does create a serious
moral hazard problem that can make financial crises more likely.  An international lender of last resort
which does not sufficiently limit these moral hazard problems can actually make the situation worse,
a subject that is discussed in the subsection following this one.
Institutional features of the financial systems in emerging markets countries imply that it may
be far more difficult for the central bank to promote recovery from a financial crisis.  As mentioned
before, many emerging markets countries have much of their debt denominated in foreign currency.
Furthermore, their past record of high and variable inflation has resulted in debt contracts of very
short duration and expansionary monetary is likely to cause expected inflation to rise dramatically.9
As a result of these institutional features, a central bank in an emerging markets country can
not use expansionary monetary policy to promote recovery from a financial crisis.  Suppose that the
policy prescription of pursuing expansionary monetary policy were followed in a emerging markets
country with the above institutional structure.  In this case the expansionary monetary policy is likely
to cause expected inflation to rise dramatically and the domestic currency to depreciate sharply.  As
we have seen before, the depreciation of the domestic currency leads to a deterioration in firms' and
banks' balance sheets because much of their debt is denominated in foreign currency, thus raising the
burden of indebtedness and lowering banks' and firms' net worth.  In addition, the upward jump on
expected inflation is likely to cause interest rates to rise because lenders need to be protected from
the loss of purchasing power when they lend.  As we have also seen, the resulting rise in interest rates
causes interest payments to soar and the cash flow of households and firms to decline.  Again the
result is a deterioration in households' and firms' balance sheets, and potentially greater loan losses
to banking institutions.   
The net result of an expansionary monetary policy in the emerging markets country with the
above institutional structure is that it hurts the balance sheets of households, firms, and banks.  Thus,
expansionary monetary policy causes a deterioration in balance sheets and therefore amplifies adverse
selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets caused by a financial crisis.
For similar reasons, lender-of-last-resort activities by a central bank in a emerging markets
country, may not be as successful as in a industrialized country.  When the Federal Reserve has
engaged in a lender-of-last-resort operation, as it did during the 1987 stock market crash, there was
almost no sentiment in the markets that this would lead to substantially higher inflation.  However,
this is much less likely to be the case for a emerging markets country.  Given the past record on
inflation, central bank lending to the financial system in the wake of a financial crisis which expands
domestic credit might arouse fears of inflation spiraling out of control.  We have already seen that if
inflation expectations rise, leading to higher interest rates and exchange rate depreciation, cash flow10
and balance sheets will deteriorate making recovery from the financial crisis less likely.  The use of
the lender-of-last-resort role by a central bank is much trickier in a emerging markets country with
the institutional structure outlined here because central bank lending is now a two-edged sword.
The above arguments suggest that central banks in emerging market countries have only a
very limited ability to extricate their countries form a financial crisis.  Indeed, a speedy recovery from
a financial crisis in a emerging markets country is likely to require foreign assistance because liquidity
provided from foreign sources does not lead to any of the undesirable consequences that result from
the provision of liquidity by domestic authorities.   Foreign assistance does not lead to increased
inflation, which through the cash-flow mechanism would hurt domestic balance sheets, and it helps
to stabilize the value of the domestic currency which strengthens domestic balance sheets. 
Thus since a lender of last resort for emerging market countries is needed at times and it
cannot be provided domestically but must be provided by foreigners, there is a strong rationale for
having an international lender of last resort.  A further rationale for an international lender of last
resort exists if there is contagion from one emerging market country to another during a financial
crisis.  Although, the jury is not out on this one, it does appear that a successful speculative attack
on one emerging market country does lead to speculative attacks on other emerging market countries,
which can lead to collapses of additional currencies.  Thus currency crises do have the potential to
snowball, and because these currency crises lead to full-fledged financial crises in emerging market
countries, the risk of contagion is indeed a serious one.  An 
international lender of last resort has the ability to stop contagion by providing international reserves
to emerging market countries threatened by speculative attacks so that they can keep their currencies
from plummeting.  This assistance can thus keep currency and therefore financial crises from
spreading.
2.2 Operation of an International Lender of Last Resort     
5See Radelet and Sachs (1998).
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The asymmetric information view of the Asian crisis suggests several guiding principles for
resolution of these crises:  1) the financial system needs to be restarted so that it can resume its job
of channeling funds to those with productive investment opportunities; 2) the faster liquidity is
provided to do this the better, 3) balance sheets of financial and non-financial firms need to be
restored so that asymmetric information problems lessen; and 4) steps need to be taken in order to
limit the moral hazard created by intervention to resolve crises.
These principles are useful in thinking about how an international lender of last resort can
conduct its operations to successfully resolve crises like the ones we have experienced recently in
East Asia.   If the lender of last resort is to restart the financial system, it must supply the financial
system with sufficient liquidity so it can start lending again.  However, another important element to
restart the financial system is that confidence in it be restored.  Not only is the liquidity supplied by
the lender of last resort necessary for this goal, but confidence that financial institutions will not
continue taking excessive risk is also essential.  This implies that insistence by the international lender
of last resort on steps to beef up the regulatory and supervisory systems in the crisis countries as a
condition for its lending can play a useful role in restoring confidence and resolving the crisis. 
If the central bank wants to reduce risk taking, it is also critical to close down insolvent
financial institutions, because if they are left in operation with so little to lose if additional loans go
sour,  they have tremendous incentives to take on huge risks.  On the other hand, restoring confidence
in the financial system means that when banks are closed down, a comprehensive plan to convince
depositors that their funds will not be at risk in institutions that remain open is needed in order to
avoid further runs on these institutions.  This maxim does not seem to have been followed when
sixteen banks were closed during the early stages of the Indonesian crisis and has led to severe
criticism of the IMF.
5   
An important historical feature of successful lender of last resort operations, is that the faster12
the lending is done, the lower is the amount that actually has to be lent.  This fact provides support
for the second principle that the faster liquidity is provided in an international lender of last resort
operation, the better.  An excellent example occurred in the aftermath of the stock market crash on
October 19, 1987.  At the end of that day, in order to service their customers accounts, securities
firms needed to borrow several billion dollars to maintain orderly trading.  However, given the
unprecedented developments, banks were very nervous about extending further loans to these firms.
Upon learning this, the Federal Reserve engaged in an immediate lender of last resort operation, with
Chairman Greenspan making an announcement before the market opened on October 20 of the
Federal Reserve's "readiness to serve as a source of liquidity to support the economic and financial
system."  In addition to this announcement, the Fed made it clear that it would provide liquidity to
banks making loans to the securities industry.  Indeed, what is striking about this episode is that the
extremely quick intervention of the Fed resulted not only in a negligible impact on the economy of
the stock market crash, but also meant that the amount of liquidity that the Fed needed to supply to
the economy was not very large (see Mishkin (1991).
The ability of the Fed to engage in a lender of last resort operation within a day of a
substantial shock to the financial system is in sharp contrast to the amount of time it has taken the
IMF to supply liquidity during the recent crises in Asian countries.  Because IMF lending facilities
have been designed to provide funds after a country is experiencing a balance of payments crisis and
because the conditions for the loan have to be negotiated, it can take several months before the IMF
makes funds available.  By this time, the crisis has often gotten much worse with the result that much
larger sums of funds are needed to cope with the crisis, often stretching the resources of the IMF.
One reason that central banks can lend so much more quickly than the IMF is that they have set up
procedures in advance to provide loans, with the terms and conditions for this lending agreed upon
beforehand.  The need for quick provision of liquidity to keep manageable the amount of funds lent
argues for credit facilities at the international lender of last resort to be set up so that funds can be13
provided quickly as long as the borrower meets the prior conditions.  Indeed, proposals to change
the way the IMF provides emergency loans so it can provide liquidity faster are currently coming to
the fore. 
The third principle indicates that resolution of a financial crisis requires a restoration of the
balance sheets of both financial and non-financial firms.  Restoration of balance sheets of non-financial
firms requires a well-functioning bankruptcy law that enables the balance sheets of these firms to be
cleaned up so they can regain access to the credit markets.  Restoration of balance sheets of financial
firms may require the injection of public funds so that healthy institutions can buy up the assets of
insolvent institutions, but also requires the creation of entities like the Resolution Trust Corporation
in the United States, which can sell off assets of failed institutions and get them off the books of the
banking sector.  The international lender of last resort and potentially other international organizations
can help this process by sharing their expertise and by encouraging the governments in crises
countries to take the steps to create a better legal structure and better resolution process for failed
financial institutions.
The fourth principle indicates that it is necessary to limit the moral hazard created by the
presence of an international lender of last resort.  An international lender of last resort creates a
serious moral hazard problem because depositors and other creditors of banking institutions expect
that they will be protected if a crisis occurs.  In the recent Asian episode, governments in the crisis
countries have used IMF support to protect depositors and other creditors of banking institutions
from losses.  This safety net creates a well-known moral hazard problem because the depositors and
other creditors have less incentive to monitor these banking institutions and withdraw their deposits
if the institutions are taking on too much risk.  The result is that these institutions are encouraged to
take on excessive risks. 
Because there is a tradeoff between the benefits of a lender-of-last-resort role in preventing
financial crises and the moral hazard that it creates, a lender-of-last-resort role is best implemented     
6See Mishkin (1998b).
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only if it is absolutely necessary.  An international lender of last resort thus has strong reasons to
resist calls on it to provide funds under normal conditions.  In other words, the lender-of-last-resort
role will be more successful in promoting financial stability if it is implemented only very infrequently.
The moral hazard problem can also be limited by the usual elements of a well-functioning
regulatory/supervisory system:  punishment for the managers and stockholders of insolvent financial
institutions, adequate accounting and disclosure requirements, adequate capital standards, prompt
corrective action, careful monitoring of risk the institution's risk management procedures and
monitoring of financial institutions to enforce compliance with the regulations.
6
However, there are often strong political forces in emerging market countries which resist
putting these kinds of measures into place. This has also been a problem in industrialized countries --
for example, an important factor in the U.S. savings and loan debacle was political pressure to
weaken regulation and supervision (e.g. see Kane (1989) -- but the problem is far worse in many
emerging market countries.  What we have seen in the Asian crisis countries is that the political will
to adequately regulate and supervise financial institutions has been especially weak because politicians
and their family members are often the actual owners of financial institutions.  An international lender
of last resort is particularly well suited to encourage adoption of the above measures to limit moral
hazard because it has so much leverage over the emerging market countries to whom it lends or who
might want to borrow from it in the future. 
There are two reasons why an international lender of last resort will produce better outcomes
if it actively encourages adoption of the above regulatory/supervisory measures.  First is that its
lender-of-last-resort actions provide governments with the resources to bail out their financial sectors.
Thus an international lender of last resort strengthens the safety net which increases the moral hazard
incentives for financial institutions in emerging market countries to take on excessive risk.  It can
counter these incentives by strengthening the regulatory/supervisory apparatus in these countries to     
7See Goldstein (1998).
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counter this problem.  Second is that the presence of an international lender of last resort may create
a moral hazard problem for governments in emerging market countries who, because they know that
their financial sectors are likely to be bailed out, have less incentive to take the steps to prevent
domestic financial institutions from taking on excessive risk.  The international lender of last resort
can improve incentives to reduce excessive risk taking by making it clear that it will only extend
liquidity to governments that put the proper measures in place to prevent excessive risk taking.  In
addition, it can reduce the incentives for risk taking by restricting the ability of governments to bailout
stockholders and large uninsured creditors of domestic financial institutions.
7  Only with this kind of
pressure can the moral hazard problem arising from lender-of-last-resort operations be contained.
One problem that arises for international organizations or foreign countries engaged in lender-
of-last-resort operations is that they know that if they don't come to the rescue, the emerging market
country will suffer extreme hardship and possible political instability.  Politicians in the crisis country
may exploit these concerns and engage in a game of chicken with the international lender of last
resort:  they resist necessary reforms, hoping that the international lender of last resort will cave in.
Elements of this game were present in the Mexico crisis of 1995 and this has also been a particularly
important feature of the negotiations between the IMF and Indonesia during the Asian crisis.
An international lender of last resort will produce better outcomes if it makes it clear that it
will not play this game.  Just as giving in to your children may be the easy way out in the short run,
but leads to children who are poorly brought up in the long run, so the international lender of last
resort will promote better policies by not giving in to short-run humanitarian concerns and let
emerging market countries escape from necessary reforms.  If the international lender of last resort
caves in to one country during a financial crisis, politicians in other countries will see that they can
get away with not implementing the needed reforms, making it even harder for the international lender
of last resort to limit moral hazard.16
The asymmetric information analysis of the Asian crisis also suggests that macroeconomic and
microeconomic policies unrelated to the financial sector deserve less emphasis in the conditionality
for the lender-of-last-resort operation.   The IMF has been criticized for imposing so-called austerity
programs on the East Asian countries.  When a currency and financial crisis develops, what the right
set of macroeconomic and nonfinancial microeconomic policies to pursue is not absolutely clear and
this is currently a hot topic of debate.  Regardless of what the right policies are, there are two reasons
why an international lender will be more successful in promoting financial stability by deemphasizing
them.
First is that the fundamental driving the crises has been microeconomic problems in the
financial sector.  Thus macroeconomic policies or micro policies unrelated to the financial sector are
unlikely to help resolve the crises.  Second is that a focus on austerity programs or these other
microeconomic problems is likely to be a political disaster.  Politicians are prone to avoid dealing with
the hard issues of appropriate reform of their financial systems, and this is particularly true in East
Asia where many of politicians' close friends, and even family, have much to lose if the financial
system is reformed properly.   Austerity programs allow these politicians to label the international
lender of last resort, the IMF in the East Asian case, as being anti-growth and even anti-Asian.  This
can help the politicians to mobilize the public against the international lender of last resort and avoid
doing what they really need to do to reform the financial system in their country.  With conditionality
focused on microeconomic policies related to the financial sector, there is a greater likelihood that
the international lender of last resort will be seen as a helping hand which aids the emerging market
country by assisting it in creating a more efficient financial system.  
  
2.3 Capital Flows and Capital Controls
In the aftermath of the Asian crisis, in which the crisis countries experienced large capital     
8See Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1994) for a model of this process.
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inflows before the crisis and large capital outflows after the crisis, much attention has been focused
on whether international capital movements are a major source of financial instability.  The
asymmetric information analysis of the crisis suggests that international capital movements can have
an important role in producing financial instability, but as we have seen this is because the presence
of a government safety net with inadequate supervision of banking institutions encourages capital
inflows which lead to a lending boom and excessive risk-taking on the part of banks.
8   Consistent
with this view, Gavin and Hausman (1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) do find that lending
booms are a predictor of banking crises, yet it is by no means clear that capital inflows will produce
a lending boom which causes a deterioration in bank balance sheets.  Indeed, Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1996) find that financial liberalization, rather than balance of payments developments inflows,
appears to be a more important predictor of banking crises.
Capital outflows have also been pointed to as a source of foreign exchange crises, which as
we have seen, can promote financial instability in emerging market countries.  In this view,  foreigners
pull their capital out of country and the resulting capital outflow is what forces a country to devalue
its currency.  However, as pointed out in earlier, a key factor leading to the foreign exchange crises
in Asia were the problems in the financial sector which led to the speculative attack and capital
outflows.   With this view, the  capital outflow which is associated with the foreign exchange crisis
is a symptom of underlying fundamental problems rather than a cause of the currency crisis.     The
consensus from many empirical studies [see the excellent survey in Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart
(1997)] provides support for this view because capital flow or current account measures do not have
predictive power in forecasting foreign exchange crises, while a deeper fundamental such as problems
in the banking sector helps predict currency crises.
The analysis here therefore does not provide a case for capital controls such as the exchange
controls that have recently been adopted in Malaysia.  Exchange controls are like throwing out the18
baby with the bath water.  Capital controls have the undesirable feature that they may block funds
from entering a country which will be used for productive investment opportunities.   Although these
controls may limit the fuel supplied to lending booms through capital flows, over time they produce
substantial distortions and misallocation of resources as households and businesses try to get around
them.  Indeed, there are serious doubts as to whether capital controls can be effective in today's
environment in which trade is open and where there are many financial instruments that make it easier
to get around these controls.  
On the other hand, there is a strong case to improve bank regulation and supervision so that
capital inflows are less likely to produce a lending boom and excessive risk taking by banking
institutions.  For example, banks might be restricted in how fast their borrowing could grow and this
might have the impact of substantially limiting capital inflows.  These prudential controls could be
thought of as a form of capital controls, but they are quite different than the typical exchange
controls.  They focus on the sources of financial fragility, rather than the symptoms, and supervisory
controls of this type can enhance the efficiency of the financial system rather than hampering it. 
2.4 The Dangers of Pegging Exchange Rates
One commonly used method to achieve price stability is to peg the value of its currency to
that of a large, low-inflation country.   In some cases, this strategy involves pegging the exchange rate
at a fixed value to that of the other country's currency so that its inflation rate will eventually gravitate
to that of the other country.  In other cases, the strategy involves a crawling peg or target in which
one country's currency is allowed to depreciate at a steady rate against that of another country so that
its inflation rate can be higher than that of the country to which it is pegged.  
Although adhering to a fixed or pegged exchange rate regime can be a successful strategy for
controlling inflation, the asymmetric information view of the Asian crisis illustrates how dangerous19
this strategy can be for an emerging market country with a large amount of foreign-denominated debt.
Under a pegged exchange-rate regime, when a successful speculative attack occurs, the decline in the
value of the domestic currency is usually much larger, more rapid and more unanticipated than when
a depreciation occurs under a floating exchange-rate regime.  For example, in the recent Asian crisis,
the worst-hit country Indonesia saw seen its currency decline to less than one-quarter of its pre-crisis
value, in a very short period of time.  The damage to balance sheets after these devaluations has thus
been extremely severe.  In Indonesia the over four-fold increase in the value of foreign debt arising
from the currency collapse made it very difficult for Indonesian firms with appreciable foreign debt
to remain solvent.  The deterioration of nonfinancial firms' balance sheets led to a deterioration in
bank balance sheets because borrowers from the banks were now less likely to be able to pay off their
loans.  The result of this collapse in balance sheets were thus sharp economic contractions as we have
seen.  
Another potential danger from an exchange-rate peg is that by providing a more stable value
of the currency, it might give foreign investors a sense of lower risk and thus encourage capital
inflows.  Although these capital inflows might be channeled into productive investments and thus
stimulate growth, we have seen that they have promoted excessive lending, manifested by a lending
boom, because domestic financial intermediaries such as banks played a key role in intermediating
these capital inflows. Furthermore, if the bank supervisory process is weak, as it often is in emerging
market, so that the government safety net for banking institutions creates incentives for them to take
on risk, the likelihood that a capital inflow will produce a lending boom is that much greater.   With
inadequate bank supervision, the likely outcome of a lending boom is substantial loan losses and a
deterioration of bank balance sheets and a possible financial crisis. 
A flexible exchange rate regime has the advantage that movements in the exchange rate are
much less nonlinear than in a pegged exchange rate regime.  Indeed, the daily fluctuations in the
exchange rate in a flexible exchange rate regime have the advantage of making clear to private firms,     
9See Mishkin (1998a).
     
10See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) for additional arguments as to why pegged exchange rate regimes may
be undesirable.
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banks, and governments that there is substantial risk involved in issuing liabilities denominated in
foreign currencies.  Furthermore, a depreciation of the exchange rate may provide an early warning
signal to policymakers that their policies may have to be adjusted in order to limit the potential for
a financial crisis.
The conclusion is that a pegged exchange rate regime may increase financial instability in
emerging market and transition countries.  However, this conclusion does not rule out that in some
situations fixing or pegging an exchange rate might be a useful way to control inflation.  Indeed,
countries with a past history of poor inflation performance may find that only with a very strong
commitment mechanism to an exchange rate peg (as in a currency board) can inflation be controlled.
9
However, the analysis does suggest that, for this strategy to be successful in controlling inflation,
policies to promote a healthy banking system are essential. Furthermore, if a country has an
institutional structure of a fragile banking system and substantial debt denominated in foreign




The financial crisis in East Asia has not only been disastrous for the economies of countries
in this region, but it has also put the global financial system under tremendous stress.  The asymmetric
information analysis of this crisis presented here provides several important lessons.  First, there is21
a strong rationale for an international lender of last resort.  Second, without appropriate conditionality
for this lending, the moral hazard created by operation of an international lender of last resort can
promote financial instability.  Third, although capital flows did contribute to the crisis, they are a
symptom rather than an underlying cause of the crisis, suggesting exchange controls are unlikely to
be a useful strategy to avoid future crises.  Fourth, pegged exchange-rate regimes are a very
dangerous strategy for emerging market countries and make financial crises more likely.  Hopefully,
what we have learned from this crisis will help us avoid repeating the mistakes which have been so
costly in this recent episode.
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